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Abstract
Nonmonotonic  reasoning techniques  based on the  use
of  default  rules  have been proposed for  requirements
engineering.  Previous works have discussed the  bene-
fits  of nonmonotonic  representations for  dealing with
conflicting  requirements, for supporting the  evolving
nature of requirements, and for  naturalness of repre-
sentation.  This paper addresses the  problem  of  iden-
tifying  and highlighting conflicts  among  requirements
without the  need to  execute the  representations  op-
erationally.  This is  an important advance  since non-
monotonic  reasoning in general,  and default  reasoning
in  particular,  are  known  to  be computationally com-
plex.  Getting an overview of  the  conflicts  among  re-
quirements can be a valuable tool for  requirements  en-
gineers. 1
Introduction
Software engineering  is  concerned with the  specifica-
tion,  development, validation  and maintenance of  soft-
ware  systems.  The construction  typically  commences
with a  collection  of  activities  that  are  called  require-
ments engineering.  It  is  concerned  with the  elicita-
tion  and modelling of  real-world  goals  for  the  software
system under construction,  its  function,  and the  con-
straints  imposed on the  software  system (Reubenstein
&: Waters 1991).  The major  objective  of  requirements
engineering  is  to  define  the  purpose and external  be-
haviour  of  the  software  system.
It  is  desirable  that  the  product of requirements engi-
neering  should be a  formal specification  capturing  cus-
tomer requirements.  The formality  of  such a  specifica-
tion  makes it  amenable to  rigorous  analysis  techniques
which, in turn,  facilitate  the  validation of  customer  re-
quirements.  Furthermore the  formality  of  specifications
makes them better  usable  at  later  stages  of  the  soft-
ware development process,  and supports  the  use of  for-
mal methods in  the  development and verification  of  the
software  system.
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The process of  translating  informal,  vague, possibly
conflicting  requirements into  a  formal specification  is
a  demanding task.  In  this  paper  we concentrate  on
a specific  family of  representations,  logical  representa-
tions,  which are  both  powerful  and popular.  Here are
some  central  issues  that  arise:
1. Inconsistency  management.  During  requirements
elicitation  it  is  almost inevitable  that  inconsistencies
arise.  They may be  the  result  of  mistakes,  misun-
derstandings,  or  lack  of  information.  They may be
the  result  of  infeasible  or  impractical  requirements,
or  due to  conflicting  information  sources.  Or sim-
ply  because different  potential  users  of  a  software
system have different  views and interests.  Issues  of
inconsistency  handling  have been subject  to  thor-
ough investigation  (Balzer  1991;  Boehm  & In  1996;
Easterbrook  & Nuseibeh  1996;  Hagensen  & Kris-
tensen  1992;  Hunter  & Nuseibeh  1997;  Nuseibeh
1996;  Robinson  & Fickas  1994;  Schwanke & Kaier
1988).
2. Evolving  requirements  and specifications.  As
(Zowghi & Often 1997) points  out,  software  develop-
ment is  characterized  by continuous  evolution.  Re-
quirements  evolve  because  requirements  engineers
and users  cannot  possibly  foresee  all  the  ways in
which a  software  system can be utilized.
.
Quality of  specifications.  Properties of  specifications
that  are  important include  the  naturalness  of  expres-
sion,  understandability,  ease  of  maintenance,  and
compactness.
The formal  method that  has  found  most application  in
specification,  in one form or another,  is  classical  logic.
It  is  an appealing form of  formal representation  offering
several  advantages: it  is  well  understood, it  has an ex-
tensive  body of  reasoning  methods and analysis  tools,
and it  allows the representation of  a broad variety  of in-
formation. Unfortunately, classical  logic  is  insufficient
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be more  specific:
¯  it  does not  work properly  with  conflicting  informa-
tion.  This is  caused by the  trivialization  that  oc-
curs  in  the  face  of  an inconsistency  (we can derive
anything  from an inconsistent  specification).  Obvi-
ously  this  property  makes  difficult  the  maintenance
of  multiple  views during  the  requirements  engineer-
ing  phase.
¯  it  provides  no  means to  support  changes  that  oc-
cur  to  a  specification  during  system evolution.  For
a logic  to  provide substantial  support to this  task,  it
would have to  provide  formal techniques  for  reason-
ing  about  changes in  information.
It  follows that  classical  logic  needs to  be extended to
offer  the  features  outlined  above.  Techniques  from
knowledge representation,  in  particular  nonmonotonic
representations  based on the  use  of  default  rules,  have
been  proposed  to  overcome  these  problems  (Luqi 
Cooke 1995;  Zowghiet al.  1996;  Zowghi & Often  1997;
Antoniou  1998).  More specifically,  (Antoniou  1998;
Zowghi et  al.  1996;  Zowghi & Often  1997)  proposed
models based  on default  logic  (Reiter  1980).  In  such
models requirements  are  represented  as  default  rules,
that  is  rules  which can be defeated  by other  rules.  Thus
the  possibility  of  conflicts  among  requirements lies  at
the  heart  of  the  underlying  reasoning  approach.
When  default  representations  are  used,  there  are
techniques  based  on sound theory  for  finding  ways of
resolving  the  conflicts  by satisfying  as  many  require-
ments as  possible.  In  general  a  set  of  requirements,
represented  as  a  default  theory,  may have several  ex-
tensions  which outline  maximal "coherent"  (to  be  made
precise  in  section  2)  sets  of  requirements  that  can be
satisfied  in conjunction.
Sometimes the  number of  possible  extensions  can be
restricted  by the  use  of  priorities  among  default  rules
(Antoniou  1997; Brewka 1994).  Prioritization  is  in-
deed an  important  issue  in  requirements  engineering.
As (Karlsson  1996) points  out,  in  software  development
projects  there  are  always more candidate  requirements
than  time  and resources  to  implement them,  since  it  is
always possible  to  add functions,  or to  improve the  user
interface.  Of these  requirements  some are  essential  to
the  success of the project  and to user satisfaction,  while
others  are  merely adornments.  Thus an important  goal
of  requirements engineering is  to  select  the  most impor-
tant  requirements;  in  interactive  development environ-
ments, for  example, it  is  possible  to  ask users  to  rank
specification  items  accordingly.  Thus a  requirements
modeling language should provide  clear  means for  rep-
resenting  and reasoning  with priority  information,  and
default  reasoning  supports  this  task  through the  exis-
tence of  sophisticated  prioritization  methods.
Previous  works have  concentrated  on the  adequacy
of  default  representations  for  requirements engineering,
on the  techniques  default  reasoning provides  to resolve
conflicts  among  requirements,  and the  support  of  the
evolutionary  nature  of  requirements  and software  sys-
tems.  In  this  paper we will  focus on a  different  prob-
lem:  the  uncovering and representation  if  direct  con-
flicts  among  requirements.  While the  existence  of  more
than  one extension  generally  suggests  that  there  are
conflicts  among  requirements,  this  observation  is  nei-
ther  necessary nor sufficient.  Moreover, it  is,  in  gen-
eral,  difficult  to  uncover the  direct  conflicts  between
requirements  from the  set  of  extensions.
(Linke  & Schaub 1998)  is  a  recent  work which de-
scribes  how a  blocking  graph can be  constructed  from
a  static  analysis  of  a  default  theory.  This graph rep-
resents  conflicts  among  default  rules.  In  this  paper we
argue that  this  technique offers  a solution  to  the prob-
lem just  described,  in that  it  helps uncover direct  con-
flicts  among  requirements.  This  information  is  valu-
able  for  the  requirements  engineer:  he/she  can use  it
to  prepare  for  the  next  round of  discussions  with the
stakeholders  of  the  software  system being designed.  An
additional  benefit  of a  blocking graph is  that  it  can be
obtained  from a  static  analysis,  that  means without
having  to  compute the  set  of  all  extensions.  This is
important  given  the  high computational  complexity  of
default  reasoning.
Basics  of  Default  Logic
We  assume that  the  reader  is  familiar  with  basics  of
(classical) logic.
In  default  logic  there  are  two kinds  of  information:
Facts  which represent  the  certain  information  avail-
able;  and  defaults  which represent  plausible  assump-
tions  that  can  be made. Facts  are  usual  first  order
formulae.  Defaults  6 have the  form
A:  B1,...,B,~
C
where A, Bi,...,Bn,  C are  closed  first  order  formulae
(and n > 0).  A is  the  prerequisite  pre(~),  Bi,...,Bn
the  justifications  just(6),  and C the  consequent cons(~)
of  5.  In  examples,  defaults  of  the  form  -~  will  be
denoted as  hypotheses  B.
Defaults  have a  nonmonotonic behaviour  because  of
the  following observation:  Initially  it  may  be the  case
that  we don’t  know anything  against,  say,  Bi.  Then we
may  be able to  apply the  default  and derive  the  conclu-
sion  C. For example,  a  software  engineer  might make  a
plausible  assumption about  customer needs.  But  later
8it  may happen that  we learn  additional  information,
among  other  that  B1 is  false.  In  our  example,  another
interview  with  the  customer may reveal  that  the  pre-
vious  assumption  about  his  needs  was wrong.  In  this
case  we  have to take  back the  conclusion C, since  it  was
based  on an assumption  that  is  no longer  valid.  Thus
acquiring  more information  can lead  to  the  retraction
of  a  previous  conclusion (something impossible in  clas-
sical  logic).  This  behaviour  is  called  nonmonotonic,
and clearly  resembles the  evolution  of  requirements and
specifications.
The meaning of  a  specification  in  default  logic  is
given in  terms of  so-called  extensions,  world views that
are  based on the  given  facts  and  defaults.  A default
theory  may have none,  one or  several  extensions.  Here
is  the formal definition.
A default  5 = A:B1,...,B,  is  applicable  to  a  deduc- c
tively  closed set  of formulae F with respect to belief  set
E (the  context)  iff  A E F,  and -~B1 ~ E,...,--,Bn  ~ 
(that  is,  each Bi is  consistent  with E).
For a  set  D of  defaults,  we say that  F is  closed under
D with respect to  belief  set  E iff,  for  every default  5 in
D that  is  applicable  to  F with respect  to  belief  set  E,
its  consequent C is  also  contained in  F.
Given  a  default  theory  T = (W,D)  and  a  set 
formulae  E,  let  AT(E) be  the  least  set  of  formulae
that  contains  W, is  closed under logical  conclusion (i.e.
first-order  deduction),  and closed  under D with respect
to  E.  Then E is  an  extension  of  Tiff  E = AT(E).
Let  us  look  at  a  simple  example  from  the  London
Ambulance Service  domain.  Suppose we have  two dif-
ferent  views of  the  same system, belonging to  different
stakeholders.  One  of  them states  that  a  specific  opera-
tor  X has  exactly  one ambulance, while  the  other  view
is  that  X has  exactly  two ambulances. In  the  sense  of
classical  logic  we have an inconsistency,  if  we add the
(background) knowledge that  it  is  impossible  for  X 
have  exactly  one  and  exactly  two ambulances  at  the
same time.
How  are  we going  to  deal  with  such  situations  in
default  logic?  Well,  since  the  information  originating
from individual  view points  is  not certain,  it  is  natural
to  represent  this  information  in  the  form of  hypothe-
ses.  On the  other  hand,  the  knowledge that  X cannot
have  both  exactly  one  and  exactly  two ambulances is
certain,  and is  thus represented as  a fact:
Hypotheses
hasExactlyOneAmbulance(X)
hasExactlyTwoAmbulances(X).
Facts
hasExactlyOneAmbulance(X)
~hasExactlyTwoAmbulances  (X).
In general,  requirements of a  stakeholder will  usually be
represented  as  a  default  (hypothesis),  while case facts
will be represented as facts.
In  our  example,  there  are  two extensions.  One, ac-
cording  to  which X has  exactly  one  ambulance,  and
one in  which X has  two ambulances.  This  shows that
the  inconsistency  has not led  to  a  trivialization  as  in
classical  logic.  Instead  we get  two extensions  which
represent  alternative  consistent  ways of  organising  the
current  information.
An  Example:  London  Ambulance
Service
In  this  section  we will  demonstrate the  application  of
the  default  logic  methodology to  inconsistency  han-
dling  using  the  London Ambulance Service,  which was
the  focus of  the  Eighth International  Workshop  on Soft-
ware Specification  and  Design (Finkelstein  & Dowell
1996).
Informal  Requirements
Requirements  elicitation  involves the  conduction of  in-
terviews  with several  stakeholders  of  the  proposed sys-
tem.  In  the  case  of  the  London Ambulance  Service  we
concentrate  on three  stakeholders:  the  incident  room
controller,  the  operations  manager, and the  logistics
manager. Let  us  look at  some of  their  statements  that
were included  in  the  initial  requirements  document  for
the  Service,  which were focused  upon in  (Hunter  & Nu-
seibeh 1997).
Incident  Room Controller
1. A medical emergency  is  either  the  result  of  an illness
or  an accident.
2. On receipt  of  a  phone call  reporting  a  medical emer-
gency,  an  ambulance  should  be  despatched  to  the
scene.
3. On  receipt  of a  phone call,  if  the  incident  is  judged
not  to  be  a  medical emergency, then  the  call  should
be transferred  to  another  emergency  service  (such as
police or fire  brigade).
Operations  Manager
4. On  receipt  of a phone call  reporting an accident,  if  an
ambulance is  available  then  it  should be despatched
to the scene.
5. On receipt  of  a phone call  reporting  an incident,  an
ambulance should  not  be  despatched  to  the  scene  if
no ambulance  is  available.Logistics  Manager
6. If  no ambulance  operators  (drivers,  medics) are avail-
able,  then  no ambulance is  available.
7. If  no ambulances  are available,  then initiate  a search
for  a  free  ambulance.
8. If  one  year  has  passed  since  the  maintenance  work
was last  done on an  ambulance, then  perform a  safety
check  on that  ambulance.
Formalization
As stated  before,  requirements  from various  stakehold-
ers  should be seen  as  defeasible,  since  they  may be in
conflict  with others.  Therefore  the  appropriate  repre-
sentation  of  these  requirements  is  to  use  hypotheses.
Then the  statements  of  the  three  stakeholders  trans-
late  directly  to the  following specification.
Hypotheses
VXVY  accident(X,  Y)  V illness(X,  Y) 
medicalEmergency(X,  Y) (a)
VXVY call(X,  Y)  A medicalEmergency(X,  Y) 
3Z despatchAmbulance(Z,  X,  Y) (b)
VXVY call(X,  Y)  A -~medicaIEmergency(X,  Y) 
trans  f  erService(  X,  Y)  (c)
VXVYVZ  call(X,  Y)  A ambulanceAvailable(Z) 
despatchAmbulance(  Z,  X,  Y)  ( 
VXVYVZ  call(X,  Y)  A ~ambulanceAvailable(Z) 
-~despatchAmbulance(  Z,  X,  Y)  (e)
V Z ~hasOper  ator  (  Z )  --+--~ambulanceAvailable(Z)
(f)
( V Z -~ambul  ance  Avail able ( Z )  ) 
initiateSearchF  or  F reeAmbulance (g)
VZ notServicedForOneYear(Z) --+
initiateSa  f  etyCheck( Z) ( h 
A  Concrete  Scenario
To check the  requirements  specification  above we have
to  add information  about  scenarios  to  see  whether the
system would exhibit  the  desired  behaviour,  or  whether
there  are  potential  conflicts  among  the  hypotheses  in
the  requirements  model.  Since  the  case  information  is
reliable  and not  subject  to  doubt (either  an  accident
was reported  or  not),  we choose to  represent  the  sce-
nario by facts.
Facts
accident  (  Grigoris,  LondonRoad)
call  (  Grigoris,  London  Road)
(i)
(J)
-,hasOperator(  Ambulance  l  ( k 
-,hasOperator(Ambulance2) (l)
VZ ambulanceAvailable(Z)  ++ Z = Ambulancel 
Z  = Ambulance2 (m)
notServicedForOneYear(Ambulance2) (n)
The fact  (m)  states  that  there  are  two ambulances,
Ambulancel  and  Ambulance2 that  may be  available.
Representing  Conflicts  Among
Requirements:  Blocking  Graph
As we have seen  a  default  theory  may have more than
one  extensions.  As (Antoniou  1998)  points  out,  the
existence  of several  extensions is  a  manifestation of ex-
isting  conflicts  among  defaults  (representing  require-
ments).  Moreover, it  may be possible  to  identify  con-
flicting  requirements  by inspecting  the  set  of  exten-
sions.  But this  requires  additional  work, and no proce-
dures were given how  the  conflicts  can be identified.
Here we will  describe  how  direct  conflicts  among  re-
quirements (default)  can be identified  without  the  com-
putation  of  extensions,  and how these  conflicts  can be
represented  in  a  graph  whose nodes  are  the  particu-
lar  requirements.  The following  presentation  is  based
(Linke  & Schaub 1998)  which introduced  the  concepts
of  blocking  set  and  blocking  graph,  and  which used
these concepts for  efficient  query answering.
Given  a  default  theory  T = (W, D) and  a  default
5 E D, we define the  set  BT((I) of  blocking sets  for (i  as
follows: A set  B C_  D is  included in  BT  ((i) 
¯  W U cons(B)  ~ -~just((i) (BS1)
¯  B can be enumerated  in a way  (io,  (it,.  ¯  ¯  such that  for
every i,  (ii  is  applicable  to Th(WO{cons((ij)  ]j  i})
w.r.t.  Th(W  U {cons((ij)  I  J  < i)). (BS2)
¯ B is  minimal in  the  sense  that  (BS1) and (BS2) 
not true  for  any (i’  and B’ such that  (i’  E BU{(I) 
B’  = B -  {(i"}  for  (i"  E S.  (BS3)
(BS1) describes the  fact  that  B clocks the  application 
default  5.  (BS2) requires  such a  block to  be a sequence
of  defaults  that  constitute  a valid  reasoning chain.  And
(BS3) states  that  B is  minimal w.r.t,  set  inclusion  and
does not contain  both a  default  and one of  its  blocking
sets  (a  kind of  consistency or  coherence condition).
Now  we define  the  blocking  graph of  T as  follows.  Its
nodes are  the  defaults  in  the  theory.  And  for  every (i
included in some  B E I3T ((i’)  we  add an edge from (i 
(i’.
For example, consider  the  default  theory  consisting
of the facts
10Figure 1:
-, f --4 abb,  f --4 abp  ,  p
and the  defaults
~1- b :  ",abb  ~2 -  B :  w,~3 = p :  b p :  ~abp
----7--’ w ---~-  , ~ 4 =  ~ f
Basically  the  knowledge  says that  birds  usually  fly  and
have wings,  while penguins are  usually  birds  but  don’t
fly.  (fl  and delta4  block one another  (for  example, ~f4
allows the derivation of abb, thus blocking (fl),  while (f3
blocks  54 (since  in  conjunction  with 51it  helps  derive
abp).  Thus the  blocking  graph looks as  follows:
The blocking graph gives  a  concise  representation  of
conflicts  among  defaults.  Moreover it  can be computed
without having to  calculate  the  extensions  of  T. This is
particularly  important  since  default  reasoning  is  known
to  be computationally  expensive.
For another  example,  in  our  London Ambulance  Ser-
vice  example,  the  defaults  (b)  and (e)  block  one 
other.  Also (e)  blocks  (d)  but  not  vice  versa:  in 
concrete  scenario  described,  no ambulance  is  available,
thus  ((d)}  is  not a blocking set  because condition (BS2)
is  violated.
The graph representing  the  conflicts  among  require-
ments can be a  valuable  tool  in  the  hands of  a require-
ments engineer.  The engineer  has  a  good and  concise
overview of  conflicts  among  requirements,  and can use
this  information  in  the  next  cycle  of  interviews  with
the  stakeholders.  Ideally  the  requirements  engineer-
ing  phase should  end with  a  set  of  requirements  such
that  the  blocking  graph is  empty.  Of course  such  an
approach may be  unrealistic.  An alternative  solution
might be to  add prioritization  to  represent  explicitly
decisions  as  to  which requirements  are  considered  more
important  than others.  Aspects of  prioritization  in  the
context  of  requirements  engineering  were discussed  in
(Antoniou  1998) based on techniques  for  default  rea-
soning  with priorities  (Antoniou 1997; Brewka 1994).
Conclusion
In  this  paper  complements  earlier  work on the  use
of  nonmonotonic  representations  and reasoning  in  the
area  of  requirements  engineering.  The focus  of  this
paper  was the  compact representation  of  direct  con-
flicts  among  requirements  through  the  computation  of
a  blocking graph.  Such a graph is  a concise  and precise
representation  of  conflicts  among requirements,  and
can assist  the  requirements engineer  during his/her  in-
terviews  with  stakeholders.  Importantly  the  blocking
graph can  be extracted  from a  static  analysis  of  the
set  of  requirements,  rather  than having to  compute the
extensions  as  proposed in  previous  works. This  advan-
tage  is  important  in  light  of  the  high  computational
complexity  of  nonmonotonic reasoning.
We intend  to  continue  work on  nonmonotonic mod-
els  for  requirements engineering.  One particular  avenue
we will  take  is  to  integrate  an implementation of  the
blocking  graph concept  in  default  reasoning  based re-
quirements  engineering  systems currently  under devel-
opment.  Also we intend  to  demonstrate  the  usefulness
of  blocking graphs through substantial  trials  with real-
world sets  of requirements.
We  will  also  study aspects  of  hypothetical  reasoning
in  more detail.  Obviously the  formalisation  of  the  re-
quirements as  default  rules  allows one to  run them with
several  alternative  sets  of facts  representing  different
hypothetical  scenarios.  In  a sense our model allows al-
ready the  inconsistent  set  of requirements to  be viewed
as  a  prototype  system,  whose behaviour  can  be  fine-
tuned  at  an  abstract  level  (for  example through  the
use of priorities).
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